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3Introduction
It has been common practice for industri-
alized nations to establish government-run pen-
sion systems to provide the elderly with income.
When these systems were created in the late
19th and early 20th centuries, most elderly peo-
ple had no income, so pensions afforded some
income for survival. Many early pension sys-
tems were pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems in
which retirees’ pensions were financed by tax-
ing the earnings of the employed. These pen-
sions were sustainable when the elderly consti-
tuted a small percentage of the population and
the amount of time spent in retirement was
short. The situation today is grossly different.
Populations in highly industrialized countries
are aging and birthrates are dropping.
Additionally, improvements in living standards
and health care have significantly increased the
average amount of time spent in retirement. In
view of these trends, the pension systems cre-
ated long ago are no longer adequate. Many
nations, however, have not adapted to the
changes in retirement patterns and as a result
face serious financial and political difficulties.
Italy is a prime example: it has ignored the need
to modernize its pension system for decades
and now must acknowledge a true crisis.
The distinguishing feature of the Italian
pension system is its generosity. The benefits
allocated by this system are copious even when
compared with the relatively generous benefits
provided by the systems of other EU nations.
Prior to the reforms of 1992 and 1995, an
Italian worker who retired after 40 years of serv-
ice received a pension of approximately 80% of
his final annual salary for the remainder of his
life. This pension was also indexed to nominal
wages so that benefits increased over time in
relation to the growth of the earnings of the
workforce. Thus, it is not surprising that Italian
pension expenditure is proportionally higher
than that in any other industrialized western
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4country. (Franco) Other factors contribute as
well to the inordinately high pension expenses
in Italy, including, in addition to the demo-
graphic challenges of low birthrates and an
aging population, the prevalence of early retire-
ment among Italians. Early retirement is per-
vasive because the pension system contains
loopholes that create incentives to stop work-
ing at a relatively early age. The combination of
an inherently generous system with an aging
population has created a cost burden that is ris-
ing to dangerous levels. 
Pension reform has always been political
dynamite in Italy because of the social welfare
implications for the elderly and the significant
costs and intergenerational wealth transfers
involved. Nevertheless, two major reforms of
the system were passed in the early 1990s. In
this paper, I describe the Italian pension system
and the two major reforms enacted in 1992 and
1995. I then argue that although these reforms
are significantly improving the pension system,
they will prove inadequate when faced with fis-
cal and demographic trends.
Pension System Overview
An overview of the major features of the
Italian pension system reveals complexity and
fragmentation. The Italian pension system the-
oretically is built on three pillars: the first is the
state-run mandatory old age insurance scheme
(Brugiavini, 2002); the second is employer-
sponsored collective pension funds; and the
third is a system of individual retirement
accounts. For most Italians the mandatory old
age insurance is the only source of retirement
income; therefore, the system has been char-
acterized as having a monolithic first pillar.
(Brugiavini, 2002) Collective pension funds,
which are essentially limited to employees in
the service, banking and insurance sectors, play
a small role overall: these funds cover only 7%
of the workforce. (Brugiavini and Fornero) In
fact, such funds were not even regulated prior
to 1992. Individual retirement accounts also
play a limited role largely because the generos-
ity of the current system reduces the incentive
to contribute to personal accounts. (Brugiavini
and Fornero) Because the first pillar is the foun-
dation of the Italian pension system, it is the
focus of my analysis.
The Pre-1992 System
The state-run pension plan includes
mandatory old age benefits, benefits to sur-
vivors and disability insurance. Workers quali-
fy for different pension schemes depending on
their occupation. The three broad classes of
employees are private sector employees, public
sector employees and the self-employed. Each
sector is covered by a separate fund. The largest
fund is the private sector employees’ fund
(INPS-FPLD),1 which covers approximately 11.7
million workers and 10.4 million pensioners.
(Brugiavini and Fornero) Public employees are
covered by several schemes that encompass 3.3
million workers and 2.4 million pensioners.
Self-employed workers have various plans
orchestrated by the INPS and cover 6.5 million
workers and 3.4 million pensioners. The three
primary schemes are mandatory and all provide
old age and disability pensions to participants
and their survivors. Nevertheless, there are sig-
nificant differences between them, especially in
their rules and benefit calculation protocols.
The FPLD (covering private sector
employees), founded in 1919, is the largest and
most important program. It was originally
financed through a combination of funding and
PAYG techniques but has since been converted
to an entirely PAYG system.2 Prior to 1992, pen-
sion eligibility began for males at age 60 and for
females at age 55, provided the worker had been
employed and paid payroll taxes for at least 15
years. Early retirement, known as a “seniority
pension,” was an option that allowed workers
with at least 35 years of service to retire at any
age. Under this system, benefits were earnings
1INPS (Instituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale) is
the National Institute for Social Security.
2PAYG pension systems operate by taxing current work-
ers and transferring the tax to pensioners. Thus, in a PAYG
system, the workers never actually accumulate savings for
retirement because their contributions are funding current
retirees and their pensions will be financed by future gen-
erations of workers. (“Survey”) Funded pension systems,
on the other hand, accumulate an employee’s contributions
(in the form of taxes) and use these savings to provide a
pension for that employee in retirement.
5related because the benefits were computed as
a function of both earnings and the number of
years of contributions. Benefits were comput-
ed by multiplying 2% of the last five years’ aver-
age salary by the number of years of contribu-
tions up to a maximum of 40 years. As a result,
workers with 40 years of experience could
receive an annual pension of approximately
80% of their final salary. 
Eligibility requirements in the public sec-
tor were somewhat different in that public sec-
tor employees were granted significant perks.
The normal retirement age in the public sector
was 65 for both males and females but the early
retirement option was available for males with
20 years and females with only 15 years of serv-
ice. The formula for computing benefits was
identical to that used in the private sector
except that the last monthly salary was used
rather than the average of the final five years.
The self-employed scheme also was similar,
except that the pension formula used the aver-
age of the last ten years of earnings. The retire-
ment age for the self-employed was 60 for
females and 65 for males, with 35 years of serv-
ice required for early retirement. In addition,
the benefits in all three systems were indexed
to nominal wages (consumer price growth plus
real earnings growth). 
The Italian pension system has had sig-
nificant redistributive features. One technique
for redistribution was capping earnings used in
the benefit calculations. From 1969 until 1988,
there was a limit on earnings that could be used
in calculating benefits. In 1988, the capping
process was made less rigid by allowing all earn-
ings to be used in benefit computation but
applying a lower rate (i.e., less than 2%) to earn-
ings above a set limit. (Brugiavini, 1997) Thus,
those pensioners with very high earnings have
traditionally received pension benefits that are
limited compared with their contributions. The
other significant source of redistribution was
the minimum benefit system. This system guar-
anteed all pensioners a minimum level of ben-
efits determined by the INPS. (Brugiavini, 2002)
If a pensioner had computed benefits below the
established minimum level, those benefits were
adjusted up to the minimum.
Historical Problems 
The most significant problem with the
Italian system prior to 1992 was its lack of con-
sistency and transparency. The unevenness of
the system is exemplified by the disparities in
the pensions of workers across different sectors:
workers in different sectors were subject to the
particular pension scheme for their sectors.
Some sectors contained features that granted
special benefits for workers of that sector. One
of the more notorious features was the early
retirement clause for public sector employees.
As mentioned previously, public sector male
employees could retire with pension benefits
after 20 years of service and female employees
were eligible for pensions after only 15 years.
This created a significant financial liability for
the system because public sector employees
could retire at a relatively young age and col-
lect benefits for a long time. The early retire-
ment clause for public sector employees epito-
mized the inequity across the pension system. 
The transparency of a pension system is a
measure of the relationship between an employ-
ee’s pension contributions and the actual pen-
sion received during retirement. A major prob-
lem with the pre-1992 system was its lack of
transparency. Workers received pension bene-
fits that were computed as a function of their
earnings rather than their total contributions.
Systems of this nature are commonly known as
defined benefits systems. The tenuous link
between contributions and benefits caused
workers to view payroll deductions simply as
taxes rather than as contributions to fund their
retirement. (Franco) The early retirement
option further distorted the link between earn-
ings and contributions because there was no
actuarial penalty for early retirees. The combi-
nation of generous benefits and the early retire-
ment option created a significant motive for
older workers to retire as early as possible. For
example, in 1994 approximately 30% of men in
the 60-to-64-year age group were employed
compared with approximately 60% employ-
ment in this group in 1958. (Brugiavini, 1997)
The structure of the pension system created an
incentive to retire, thereby increasing the state’s
financial burden. It also appears that the gen-
6erosity of the mandatory pension system dis-
couraged household savings because workers
believed their pension benefits would provide
sufficient income in retirement. (Brugiavini,
1997) 
Generous pension benefits and structural
system weaknesses, combined with unfavorable
demographic trends, have resulted in financial
disequilibrium plaguing the system. In 1992,
the payroll tax necessary to balance the pension
system budget was estimated to be in the range
of 35%–42%, but the actual payroll tax was
26.4%. (Brugiavini, 2002) This deficit had to be
financed through government subsidy. A relat-
ed problem was that the high payroll tax rates,
although insufficient to finance pension expen-
ditures, were sufficiently high to discourage the
use of private pensions. (Brugiavini and
Fornero) This inauspicious state of the system
was the impetus behind two significant reforms
in the 1990s.
The 1992 Reform
The first major reform, the Amato reform,
was passed in 1992. The objective of this act was
to reduce pension liabilities by tightening eli-
gibility conditions and eliminating the special
features that existed for employees in certain
sectors. For example, the normal retirement
age was raised from 55 to 60 for females and
from 60 to 65 for males. Early retirement pro-
visions were standardized by gradually raising
the early retirement requirement for public sec-
tor employees to 35 years of service.
Additionally, the minimum number of years of
work required to qualify for a pension was
increased from 15 to 20. 
The Amato reform was not limited to the
harmonization of rules across each sector;
much of the reform was devoted to consider-
ably amending the formula for pension com-
putation. The modified benefit formula used the
last 10 years’ earnings rather than the last 5
years’ earnings for employees in the public and
private sectors. This change was scheduled to
be phased in over a 10-year transition period
beginning in 1992. The adjustment was espe-
cially significant for employees with fewer than
15 years of work experience in 1992 because
they became subject to a new benefit computa-
tion formula that used lifetime earnings rather
than the final ten years. These lifetime earnings
were converted into real terms, however, by
adjusting earnings with the cost of living index
plus 1%. 
Another practice that received significant
amendment was benefit indexation. Prior to
1992, benefit indexation was based on nominal
wages. Nominal wage indexation is the adjust-
ment of benefits each year according to the
growth of consumer prices plus the growth in
real earnings. The 1992 reform immediately
eliminated nominal indexation and replaced it
with a price indexation system. Under this price
indexation system, benefits are adjusted by only
the growth in consumer prices. (Brugiavini,
1997) 
Analysis of the 1992 Reform
The reforms enacted in 1992 were suc-
cessful in decreasing the liabilities of the pen-
sion system. Economists estimate that at least
25% of net pension liabilities were cancelled by
this reform. (Franco) The reform also was valu-
able because it initiated a general harmoniza-
tion of pension rules across the different seg-
ments of workers. The elimination of special
rules, such as the early retirement provision for
public sector employees, not only reduced costs
but also increased the equity of the system.
Although the reformed system was still an earn-
ings-related system, the use of adjusted lifetime
earnings in benefit calculation reinforced the
link between contributions and benefits.
Furthermore, because the Amato reform used
lifetime earnings for benefit calculation, it elim-
inated the original system’s bias towards work-
ers whose earnings increased near the end of
their careers. (Franco) 
One amendment that has had substantial
effects was the switch from wage indexation to
price indexation. This change immediately
reduced pension liabilities because of the result-
ing smaller annual pension adjustments.
(Brugiavini, 2002) This is because, under the
original system, pensioners’ benefits were
increased by the growth in consumer prices
plus the growth in real wages whereas, since
71992, benefits have been adjusted by only the
growth in consumer prices. Although price
indexation reduces pension liabilities, it also
means that the purchasing power of a pension-
er drops over time relative to the purchasing
power of workers and younger pensioners.
(Brugiavini, 2002)
Although the 1992 reform successfully
reduced pension liabilities, it failed to address
several critical areas. The special early retire-
ment conditions (20 years of service for men,
15 years for women) for public sector employ-
ees were eliminated but employees in all sec-
tors still retained the right to retire after 35
years of service without any actuarial reduction
of their pension. This was a serious concern
because the availability of early retirement
undermined the increase in retirement age.
That is, increasing the standard retirement age
to 65 for men and 60 for women was ineffective
in delaying retirement because workers could
circumvent the new age requirements simply
by retiring early. (Franco) 
The most significant limitation of the
Amato reform was that many of its components
required a long transitional period, so that the
benefits could not be immediately implement-
ed. For example, the change to a lifetime salary
average for benefit computation only applied to
those with fewer than 15 years of service as of
1992; a substantial portion of the population
was unaffected by much of the reform. The full
impact of this reform could not be realized until
years later.
Despite its shortcomings, the 1992 reform
was the first major reform to reduce pension
liabilities and to attempt to achieve financial
equilibrium. It was particularly important
because it brought to light the challenges fac-
ing the pension system and opened the door to
further reform. The 1992 (Amato) system will
never achieve a steady state, however, as it was
replaced by the Dini reform of 1995.
(Brugiavini, 2002) 
The 1995 Reform 
The 1995 Dini reform sought to improve
the viability of the pension system in a funda-
mentally different way. Its primary objective was
to create a contribution-based pension scheme
that would both decrease pension expenditures
and increase equity. (Franco) The Dini reform
created a system known as a notionally defined
contribution (NDC) system. The system is so
named because workers contribute throughout
their careers, notionally accumulating rights to
a retirement account. Then, at the time of
retirement, that value is converted into a life-
time annuity according to actuarial criteria.
(Brugiavini and Fornero) The system is notion-
al in the sense that it uses a benefit computa-
tion protocol similar to that of a funded system
but retains its PAYG financing. Contributions
from the currently employed pay the retirees’
benefits. The pension benefits are calculated as
a function of the individual’s lifetime wage pro-
file, length of employment, retirement age and
the growth rate of the economy. (Brugiavini and
Fornero) 
The Dini scheme addresses early retire-
ment by eliminating the standard retirement
age and creating a flexible retirement age of 57
to 65. Equity of benefits is ensured by applying
actuarial adjustment factors to account for the
age of retirement in benefit computations. A
person who chooses to retire at age 57 receives
a smaller pension than if retirement is delayed,
because that person has reduced his or her total
pension contributions and increased the
amount of time spent in retirement. The Dini
reform eliminated seniority pensions for those
entering the workforce after 1995 and gradual-
ly abolished the practice of traditional early
retirement that was still available to older work-
ers. Finally, the Dini reform lowered the mini-
mum number of years of contribution to
receive a pension from 20 (under the 1992
reform) to 5. 
Current Analysis
The Dini reform is important because it
built on the improvements of the 1992 reform.
The switch from a defined benefits system to a
defined contribution system greatly enhanced
the transparency of the system.3 The 1995
reform also created a more equitable system
because it reduced the number of redistributive
3As noted, the system retains its PAYG financing but
pension benefits are calculated using the sum of all con-
tributions to the notional pension fund.
8elements. For example, the 1995 reform estab-
lished a cap on earnings subject to contribu-
tions. This is an equitable method of capping
benefits for high earners. (Kidric and
Stanovnik) Prior to this, there was no cap on
contributions but benefits were effectively
capped because earnings above a certain level
factored less heavily in benefit computation.
The Dini reform also eliminated the guaranteed
minimum pension level. Most of the social
assistance functions previously administered
through the pension system were delegated to
the central government. This restricting of pen-
sion expenditures to retirement and disability
payments limited the degree of redistribution
and, consequently, tightened the relationship
between employee contributions and pension
benefits. (Brugiavini, 2002) 
The reforms of 1995 will, in theory, ame-
liorate many of the problems inherent to the
historical system. The increased transparency
should foster a stronger incentive to work
longer and retire later because benefits are
explicitly related to total contributions to the
notional pension fund. The Dini system reduces
the incentive for early retirement, a recently
pervasive phenomenon, by ultimately holding
employees more accountable for their pensions.
The incorporation of actuarial factors is a break-
through for a system that previously never
penalized early retirees. The Dini system estab-
lishes an appropriate protocol for adjusting pen-
sion benefits according to retirement prefer-
ences. It also provides protection from certain
economic and demographic shocks because it
incorporates GDP growth rates and life
expectancy estimates in the computation of
pension benefits. If, for example, there is an
increase in average life expectancy, it is
accounted for in the benefit calculation formu-
la and pension benefits can be adjusted accord-
ingly. The 1995 reform is, at least on paper, sig-
nificantly more equitable and uniform than any
previous system. 
Even though this Italian pension system
is much improved, it remains beset with inad-
equacies that undermine its efficacy. One major
flaw of the 1995 reform is its long phase-in peri-
od. In fact, an estimated 40% of the current
workforce will retire under the pre-1992 for-
mula for benefit computation because those
workers with at least 18 years of service in 1992
will receive pensions based on the pre-1992 sys-
tem. (Franco) Those employees with fewer than
18 years of service in 1995 will receive their
pension pro rata, calculated as two different
benefits: one based on contributions before
1995 and one based on contributions made in
1995 and thereafter. Only workers who began
working after 1995 will have their entire pen-
sion calculated under the 1995 rules. (Franco)
There is little doubt that the 1995 system is sig-
nificantly more transparent than those devel-
oped in previous regimes. Yet the current sys-
tem, an intricate conglomeration of three
different systems, is convoluted and difficult to
decipher. It will not be until the 1995 system is
fully phased in that a high level of transparen-
cy will be achieved. Hence, the long phase-in
period temporarily reduces the efficacy of the
1995 reform. (Brugiavini, 2002) 
The 1995 reform has potential weakness-
es other than its protracted phase-in period.
There is controversy regarding the effectiveness
of the actuarial coefficients in delaying retire-
ment. The actuarial calculations are used to
adjust benefits according to the age of retire-
ment so that an individual retiring at age 57
receives a lower benefit than if retiring later.
According to Brugiavini and other experts, the
current actuarial factors do not exact a penalty
sufficient to discourage early retirement.
(Franco) As a result, workers are willing to
accept moderately lower pensions in exchange
for longer time in retirement. Another frequent
criticism of the 1995 system centers on the
adjustment factors for life expectancy, updated
only every 10 years. This is judged as too infre-
quent to account for changing life expectancies.
(Kidric and Stanovnik) This problem could be
corrected by simply updating the tables more
frequently.
The most pressing issue facing the pen-
sion system now, in 2003, is its financial imbal-
ance. The Dini system, once fully phased in, will
improve the balance between pension obliga-
tions and revenues. This system, however,
because it employs PAYG financing, will always
be vulnerable to demographic shocks. (Franco)
All PAYG pension systems face financial trou-
bles when birthrates decline, as fewer young
people are paying the pension costs of older
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make Italian labor even more expensive, poten-
tially making Italy less economically competi-
tive. (Brugiavini, 2002) 
It appears that Italy’s present situation will
require sacrifice on the part of older workers.
Unless Italy is prepared to finance pension
deficits by accumulating national debt, there
will have to be a reduction of pension expendi-
tures to equilibrate finances. The source of this
expenditure decrease would have to come from
the reduction of benefits. The immediate imple-
mentation of the Dini regime is one means of
reducing current liabilities. Ferraresi and
Fornero estimate that this course of action
would trim pension expenditures by 0.8% of
GDP in 2020. (Franco) The underlying problem
is that any reforms attempting to reduce the
pension levels of pensioners or workers near-
ing retirement are met with hostility, for chang-
ing the rules of their accumulated entitlements
late in the game. Yet, for Italy to overcome its
immediate problems, current pension expendi-
tures must be diminished, even if that requires
treading on politically sensitive ground.
workers. This is the exact situation that Italy is
now facing. All the reforms to this point have
been extremely helpful in improving the struc-
ture of the pension system and in reducing
costs, but a serious problem remains in that the
extant system is running a deficit and demo-
graphic projections are unfavorable for the next
several decades. Numerous models have been
used to predict pension expenditures and, based
on these predictions, the Italian Treasury
reports that the pension expenditure to GDP
ratio will continue to increase until between
2030 and 2035. (Brugiavini and Fornero) After
this time, the pension expenditure to GDP ratio
is expected to decline moderately. Nevertheless,
it is evident that the pension deficit will only
increase over the next 30 years and, therefore,
immediate intervention is necessary. 
One simple solution is to increase payroll
taxes to help finance current pensions. The
inadequacy of this solution is that an increase
in the contribution rate for existing employees
translates into higher benefits later when these
employees retire. An ancillary obstacle is that
increasing the already high payroll taxes would
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